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Following the ‘bread riots’ of October 1988, the Islamist
movement was the biggest benefactor of the introduc-
tion of democracy in Algeria, quickly amassing huge
political support and winning landslide victories in local
and legislative elections. But instead of using its newly
acquired power to install democratic principles
throughout Algeria, the Islamist movement fell victim
to its own aspirations. Today, as Algeria observes the
tenth anniversary of the October riots, certain conclu-
sions are self-evident. Overall, Algeria’s Islamist leader-
ship has proven ill equipped to handle its success or its
own agenda.
Algeria’s Islamist
M o v e m e n t
Victims of Success
The Riots
The typical Algerian who demonstrated in
the country’s major cities, now a decade ago,
was compelled more by immediate economic
concerns than long-term political goals like
democracy. For years, Algerians suffered the
consequences of failed economic policies and
had finally grown frustrated with chronic
unemployment, inadequate wages, inflation
and substandard housing. Those who took to
the streets in October 1988 protested for basic
necessities, hoping to get the government’s
attention if not economic reform.
Political pluralism was not on their agenda:
the FLN’s (National Liberation Front) one-party
system of government maintained such firm
control of opposition activities inside the coun-
try that it became too difficult to engage in
political activism against the State. As such,
opposition leaders like Ait Ahmed of the Social-
ist Front Forces (FFS) and former President
Ahmed Ben Bella concentrated their activities
within Europe, trying to mobilize Algerians liv-
ing abroad, not locally, against the FLN’s politi-
cal monopoly. Furthermore, Algerians were dis-
inclined to pursue pluralism as the opposition
groups were widely perceived as weak and ‘out
of touch’ with the population.
In this way, the religious Islamist opposition
was somewhat an exception. Though active,
the Islamist movement was too divided to
effectively challenge the state authorities when
the bread riots occurred. The Islamists, howev-
er, were succeeding in relating to Algeria’s dis-
heartened society and capitalizing upon the
failure of the FLN’s secular approach to devel-
opment. More importantly, they channelled
the population’s mounting anger against the
government to their own advantage: collecting
huge sums of money from donors, they pro-
moted themselves by constructing privately-
run mosques and responded to social needs by
providing houses for newly-weds and Islamic
dresses for young girls.
Effects of the Riots
Following the October riots, the political liber-
alization initiated by President Benjedid was
welcomed by Algerians of every ideological
stripe: in less than six months, more than 50 par-
ties were formed. Unlike any other time, Algerian
leaders were now seen debating, criticizing each
other and government policies. Behind the
scenes, however, the FLN retained its colossal
powers and continued to privatize the economy,
relaxing laws on importation and price controls.
For the vast majority of Algerians, the quick
combination of democratization and privatiza-
tion was proving disastrous. Government poli-
cies were benefiting a privileged few who
could seize new opportunities in the markets.
In contrast, the Algerian state struggled with
international debts due to a sharp decline in oil
revenues, forcing the FLN to relinquish some of
its social welfare responsibilities, particularly in
health care, education and housing.
The government’s failure to address the socio-
economic problems of the masses had a tremen-
dous impact on the Islamist movement, now
legalized and represented by more than 15
political institutions. Specifically, it legitimized
the Islamists’ struggle for a better state and even
rallied enough militant support to make violent
change an option. With social disparities even
more glaring, the Islamists had become the
voice of the impoverished. As democratic
change slowly became a part of Algerian life, the
Islamist movement was growing rapidly and
evolving into the most potent political force in
the country.
Rise of the Islamist Movement
Undoubtedly, the Islamists’ greatest success
was in connecting with Algeria’s abandoned
youth – those who failed in school and in the
labour market and who were portrayed as soci-
ety’s losers. To them, the mosques became a
place of refuge where respect and understand-
ing could be found, where the state’s policies
and the government’s shortcomings were to
blame for their personal failures. Armed with a
new attitude and seen as being in touch with
God, the abandoned youth quickly regained
respectability in society, something it clearly
owed to the Islamist movement and no one else.
Although the budding Islamist movement was
gaining momentum, internal strife hindered its
development as a viable political entity. Though
bonded by common religious symbols, sets
within the movement were increasingly divided
over political strategies and ideological issues
and appeared to be moving in two distinct direc-
tions: one towards greater unification and the
other towards fragmentation. Before 1988,
many religious and political disagreements were
left to be sorted out in the mosques. This contin-
ued during the democratization process; all
Islamists seemed united in their antagonism
towards the secular state, but sharp differences
remained over how Islam was to solve Algeria’s
problems. Ultimately, the mosques themselves
became host to disputes, contributing to frag-
mentation within the movement.
Ideological Divisions
Divisions within the Islamist movement have
existed since the 1970s between the Liberal-
Algerianites, Djeza’ara, who advocated an
indigenous form of Islamic activism and the
Shoyoukh, ‘elder persons’, who believed in
linking Algeria’s Islamist movement with the
Mashreq’s, particularly the Muslim Brother-
hood of Egypt. The differences between Djeza-
’ara and Shoyoukh have centred on how they
perceived the role of Islam in modern society
and in governmental policies. 
The Djeza’ara have followed Malek Bennabi,
an Algerian scholar and philosopher. Educated
in France in the 1950s, Bennabi later lived in
Egypt and returned to Algeria when it became
independent. Bennabi’s thoughts encompass
elements of Western modernity and Islamic
traditions and intend to reconcile these two
contradictory facets of Algerian life. To
Bennabi, Western civilization can be beneficial
to the Muslim world, especially in the areas of
science and administration. But Bennabi has
also criticized Western civilization for its moral
decay and has urged Muslims to be cautious in
what they take from it. Bennabi has been influ-
ential among university students and others
who believe that openness to Western culture
is necessary for Algeria’s development and,
more recently, parties such as the Algerian
Islamic Assembly.
In contrast, the Shoyoukh have long con-
tended that the Algerian religious establish-
ment lacked the intellectual background to
form a religious doctrine without the Mashreq’s
help. Many of this group were former students
of Sheik Abdel Hamid Bin Badis, the founder of
the Ulama Association, a reformist movement
formed in 1930 to combat France’s coloniza-
tion and prepare Algerian society for indepen-
dence. During the 1970s and 1980s, many
leaders sought to establish ties with the Egypt-
ian Brotherhood in an attempt to link the
Algerian struggle for an Islamist state with oth-
ers in the Mashreq. Now, the reformist ideas of
the Shoyoukh are represented by many mod-
erate Islamist parties, like Hamas, even though
an alliance with the Mashreq is no longer
s o u g h t .
Despite their differences, the Djeza’ara and
the Shoyoukh have shared a common disdain
for the FLN’s overall treatment of religion,
especially its moves to impose state control
over mosques. Additionally, the two Islamist
camps have both supported incremental social
change and working to change Algeria’s politi-
cal structure from within society.
Since the mid-1980s, however, this moderate
approach has been shunned by the younger
Islamist recruits who reject peaceful change
and adhere to a strict interpretation of Islamic
texts. Known as Salaf, in reference to the fol-
lowers of the Prophet Mohammed and his way
of life, this camp espouses the ideas of many
militant thinkers, including Egyptian Seyyed
Qotb and Pakistani Abou Alla al Mawdudi.
These recruits have come to see Islam through
the eyes of Iranian revolutionaries, Afghan
rebels and older militant Islamists who have
provided literature and tapes about radical
Islam. It has been this younger set that has so
markedly radicalized the Islamist movement in
the 1990s, as many of them have become mem-
bers of groups preaching violence as a means
of change. Consistent with their role models,
the ultimate goal of these recruits is to estab-
lish a Sharia state, the rule of religious authori-
t y .
When the October events occurred, no oppo-
sition group – religious or secular – was in a
position to effectively organize the Algerian
masses with the intent to impose a new politi-
cal order. In the absence of a charismatic lead-
ership, the Islamist movement grew but the
loyalty of its adherents was mostly directed to a
local leader, not a national figure. As a result,
while the Islamist movement was expanding, it
also became increasingly prone to fragmenta-
tion. Generally, people were joining Islamist
institutions out of religious conviction, not for
political reasons. Consequently, many found
themselves supporting political parties that did
not necessarily represent their views. This was
characteristic of the membership of the FIS.
Rise and Fall of the FIS
Soon after Algeria’s democratization process
began, the Islamist movement was dominated
by a single party, the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS). Unlike other Islamic political parties,
which had strict recruitment policies, the FIS
recruited various types of people, regardless of
their educational background, gender or race.
This open-door policy gave the FIS a truly pop-
ulist appeal and helped it to cinch victory in
the electoral polls of the early 1990s.
But other FIS policies were partly responsible
for the fragmentation of the movement. On
several occasions, FIS leader Abassi Madani
declined invitations to attend the gatherings
of other political parties, even making a mock-
ery of some. Instead of acting as a unifying
force within the movement, the FIS alienated
the smaller Islamist groups. In addition, the
FIS’s open-door recruitment policy brought
serious divisions within the party’s own politi-
cal structure; with so much diversity, it seemed
impossible to maintain the democratic spirit at
all times. The FIS’s second-in-command, Ali
Belhaj, exacerbated the problem with his
repeated objections to democracy, calling it an
alien concept and a source of evil. Having
never visited a democratic state, Belhaj was
merely reiterating what other militant thinkers,
particularly Qotb and Mawdudi, had written.
Still, since the FIS included members from the
Djeza’ara, Shoyoukh and Salaf camps, Belhaj’s
position fuelled more disagreement among
the ranks.
It was increasingly evident that for Madani
and Belhaj, the struggle in Algeria was not for
democracy, but rather for the establishment of
a Sharia state. Several instances indicated that
the FIS leadership was more interested in accu-
mulating political power than in actually shar-
ing it. The FIS acted as if it were a state within
the Algerian state, setting up courts in the
mosques to punish violators and creating its
own military force, the Armed Islamic Salva-
tion. Furthermore, the FIS leaders appeared
tolerant of political violence; they stood silent
when militant Islamists from their own ranks
formed the menacing Armed Islamic Group.
Then, in June 1991, they called for a strike to
boycott the country’s electoral laws, a strike
that later turned bloody as over 500 people
died in clashes with the state police. It is also
notable that, until recently, the FIS had not
condemned the horrific violence perpetrated
by some militants against Algerian civilians.
Of all of its shortcomings, the FIS’s biggest
mistake was to underestimate the Algerian
military. With its overwhelming success in the
local elections in the early 1990s, the FIS
became overconfident, believing that it could
topple the military politically. The FIS went so
far as to solicit soldiers to join its ranks in an
attempt to rescue the State from its malaise of
corruption and socio-economic problems. This
was a gross miscalculation; the military saw the
FIS’s call as a threat to its national supremacy.
In response, the military forcefully intervened
before the FIS could win an absolute majority
in the 1992 parliamentary elections and
rewrite the Algerian constitution to its own
terms. Shortly thereafter, the FIS was officially
banned. But since the ousting of the FIS from
the formal political arena, the smaller Islamist
parties have also failed to lay claim to the
Islamist leadership or to put an end to the ter-
rorism carried out by certain extremist groups.
Undoubtedly, the Islamist movement was a
major political force in Algeria during the ini-
tial stages of its democratization. Ideological
fragmentation and the spread of militant
Islam, however, has since undermined the
movement and spun it out of control. In retro-
spect, the Islamist movement misused the
democratic process, but did not escape the
consequences of that abuse. ♦
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